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Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason

Oxford University Press (1988)

Authors
Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
Contending that only a normative theory of rationality can be adequate to the complexities of the subject, this book explains and defends the view that rationality consists of the intelligent pursuit of appropriate objectives. Rescher considers the mechanics, rationale, and rewards of reason, and argues that social scientists who want to present a theory of rationality while avoiding the vexing complexities of normative deliberations must amend their perspective of the rational enterprise.
Keywords Reason  Reasoning  Rationalism
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Call number B833.R47 1988
ISBN(s) 0198244355   9780198244356
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Truth, Thinking, Testimony and Trust: Alvin Goldman on Epistemology and Education.Harvey Siegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):345-366.
Argumentation and the Force of Reasons.Robert C. Pinto - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (3):268-295.
The Problematic Welfare Standards of Behavioral Paternalism.Douglas Glen Whitman & Mario J. Rizzo - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (3):409-425.

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