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I've been looking at the field, and I can't really see how most of this is useful. ZKPs and FHE add a lot of complexity to a pretty simple task: verifying the age and/or identity. These tasks are so simple that you can _almost_ use the existing TLS client certificates for that. Their only drawback is that they're trackable. A simple asymmetric challenge-response system with a nonce easily fixes this: 1. The service provider generates a 128-bit nonce and sends it to me. 2. I use a verification system provided by my government, and it returns a document saying: "The owner is more than 18 years old, the nonce for the request was ......, and this proof is valid for this service name hash". This document is signed by the trusted government certificate. 3. I send this signed document to the service provider. No need for range proofs and other stuff. I think this flow can even be expressed using OIDC and JWTs! What am I missing that requires full-blown ZKPs? | | | |
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